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THE IRRIGATION QUESTION IN CALIFORNIA.
The economic future of the far west is largely dependent on
a practical solution of the problem of irrigation. Millions of
acres lie there sterile and lifeless, yet with all the elements of fer-
tility locked up in the soil, and with a sunshine and a climate
favorable to every kind of agricultural production. The nimble
jugglery of the statistician does not enable one to grasp
the situation. Square acres of maps and huge columns of fig-
ures convey but a dim impression of the urgency of the problem.
Only the traveler who has passed over the vast solitudes and
witnessed the transformation wrought here and there by some
unknown Aaron of the wilderness, can appreciate the enormous
forces of nature waiting for a deliverer. From the earliest set-
tlement of the arid states of the West it was apparent that the
question of water rights could not be left to the old rules of the
common law. They were not adequate to the exigency. Their
customs were crystallized into rigid rules in a land and a time
when the permanent diversion of the water of a stream to irri-
gate the land of riparian owners for the purposes of cultiva-
tion was not required. In the far west on the contrary, the land
is to a large extent valueless without the annexed right to appro-
priate water for the growth of crops. But the water is limited
in amount while the irrigable area is almost illimitable,
and the unguarded right of appropriation in one deprived
another of the use of his property. The question forced
itself at once into the domain of public regulation. Various
complex codes sprang into existence having for their object
the reconciliation of conflicting private interests and the great-
est possible utility to the irrigable territories of all possible
sources of water. So far as these laws provided for the regula-
tion of private rights alone they were not sufficient; laws allowing
the absolute ownership of water by an individual very often sac-
rificed the subsequent public welfare and the just rights of future
settlers for the sake of a definite adjudication of title. Laws
which allowed the proprietorship of water only to the actual
occupant and cultivator of land, prevented the formation of com-
panies to disperse the water over large areas. In States where
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the old substratum of the common law underlay the subsequent
statutory enactment, satisfactory decision of some complex prob-
lems could not be obtained. In California no one has ever been
able to determine how much water a subsequent proprietor set-
tling on the stream above a prior settler, could use for irrigation
without entrenching on the rights of the lower owner. The
Supreme Court, in a decision' some two hundred pages long,
finally held that he could use as much as was necessary to culti-
vate the land provided he did not so divert the water as to ma-
terially injure his neighbor. The rule raised a very mixed
question of law and fact as to what diversion was a "material"
injury, and only added to the confusion already existent.
The dominant fact in the comprehension or settlement of the
irrigation question is the incapacity of the individual to deal
successfully with the problem and the con-,equent failure of laws
acting on the individual alone to solve it. The settlers of
the West were generally poor and their successors have lim-
ited capital. On the other hand the irrigation of arid lands
of any locality very often require the construction on a great
scale of works for the imprisonment and dispersion of the water.
Dams have often to be driven down scores of feet through drift
gravel to collect the percolating waters of sunken rivers, or tunnels
to be driven through a great wall of rock to intercept the mbun-
tain flood. Subsidiary reservoirs are often required to subdivide
the waters, canals lined with concrete and many miles long to be
dug-power houses to force the reluctant tide to the point of
ultimate dispersion. The work and capital required to supply one
land owner with water often suffice to supply a hundred with
the same facilities. The cost of such enterprises, even where of
modest dimensions, is practically prohibitive to the individual irri-
gator, although the relative cost to each of the farmers of the
community might be small. The power of organized capital is re-
quired and the cotbperated support of the community. Such capi-
tal must be sought most often beyond the locality and frequently
beyond the State. Private corporations to monopolize and hire
out the water have been accordingly largely the means by
which the arid tracts of the West have been made capable of
cultivation. In favorable localities they have operated with some
success. But there are many grave objections to leaving the
question to private capital. Where it divorces the ownership of
the water from the land, friction arises between the company and
I Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal.
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the irrigators. The cultivator suspects that he is robbed, as very
likely he may be-and resents the " tyranny" of dues. Granger
legislation is passed fixing rates 2 and harrassing or throttling capi-
tal. Such companies are also often involved in a mesh of litiga-
tion which heavily increases its charges. The sources of water
are so valuable and conflicting titles are so easily born of the
vague claims of early occupants, that vexatious litigation, and
ruin very often attends the attempted appropriation or pur-
chase of a water right. The same difficulties increased by
internal dissentions very often attend the formation of stock
companies by the cultivators. One result is that capital to de-
velop water rights is not easily obtained in many sections of the
great West, or it can be gotten only on exorbitant terms.
To secure the immense amount of capital required a ground
work of unquestionable security for the investment must be
obtained; to obtain a clear title to water rights the barnacles of
conflicting claims must be cleared away and to secure the just
and equitable distribution of the water for the greatest
good of the greatest number, resort must be had to some
degree of public regulation and control. A public corporation
providing security for capital by the power of taxation, clearing
titles by the exercise of the right of eminent domain can alone
completely answer all the requirements of the problem. The
legislature of California accordingly passed the Wright act in
x887. The basal principle of this act was the division of the arid
areas of the State into communities or districts whose limits were
determined by their irrigability from the same common source of
water supply and the same system of works. The admirable
object of this act was to group productive communities around
centers of water supply which would irrigate all the land within
the district. The districts were, however, not attempted to be
arbitrarily formed in the act, but were to be formed on the in-
vitation of the people of the locality in accordance with the gen-
eral provisions of the law instituted by a petition signed by the
required number of freeholders and acted on by the Board of
County Supervisors.'
So the great public powers of taxation and eminent domain
are united with home rule as to the extent of debt incurred and
the details of management. It is the general testimony of all
2 This is done in Wyoming.
3 For a sketch of the essential provisions of the act the reader is referred to
Bradley v. Fallbrook. Irr. Dis. 68, Fed. Rep. 948; the Yale Law Journal
for December, 1895, may also be consulted.
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who are familiar with the situation in California that the act
has been eminently successful in attaining the reclamation of a
very large area of arid land which private capital would in all
tikelihood never have developed. Many millions of dollars
have been invested in the municipal bonds of the various
districts and the prosperity of many sections of the State has
largely increased through its operation. The exercise of the
power of taxation by the district government and the consequent
sales of land within the district for delinquent assessments
against the consent of the owners led to bitter assaults on the
validity of the act. The arbitrary incorporation of whole cities
and towns within the districts by the Boards of Supervisors has
lent fuel to the fire. The high valuation of the improved prop-
erty of these municipalities largely lighten the burden to the
farmer tax payer within the same district. Each land owner is
entitled to receive a share of the water for irrigation purposes in
proportion to his assessment, and, theoretically, he receives his
benefits in the sale of his share in case he does not wish to use it.
But the acquisition of a large supply of water for "irrigation"
-purposes by the owner of a dry goods "emporium" in the middle
of a city is a somewhat inadequate return for his tax.'
As a consequence the validity of the act under which these
district corporations were organized and the constitutionality of
their exercise of the power of taxation was brought before the
Supreme Court of California in five different cases.' A large
number of technical objections were raised in all these cases
attacking the acts of the district officials on the ground that the
requirements of the act itself were not complied with; but so
far as these objections do not assail the constitutionality of the
act under which they were formed they are passed over.
6
The Supreme Court of California uniformly overruled these
objections and upheld the validity of the law as constitutional on
reasons largely of public policy. The law was regarded as firmly
established in view of the affirmation by the Supreme Court of
4 Real property is required to be listed by statute at its full cash value,
including improvements.
Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360; Central Irrigation
District v. De Koppe, 79 Cal. 351; Crall v. Poso Irrigation Dist., 87 CaL i4o;
Board of Directors v,. Tregea, 88 Cal. 334; Zn Re Madera Irrigation District,
92 Cal. 307.
6 Numerous questions were raised impeaching the constitutionality of the
act under the peculiar provisions of the Constitution of California affecting
municipal corporations. None of these objections have solidity. For a dis-
cussion of them, see In Re Madera, etc., 92 Cal. 307.
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the United States of the constitutionality of the reclamation dis-
tricts which were public district corporations formed to drain
swamp and overflowed lands.'
The opinion of judge Ross in July last,' rendered in the Cir-
cuit Court for the Southern District of California, practically
upholding the vital objections raised before the Suprenie Court of
California in the cases cited fell like a thunder bolt from the clear
heaven, staggering investors and invalidating all the bonds
issued under the act.' The reasons advanced by Judge Ross for
holding the exercise of the power of taxation by the district
authorities invalid divides into two great branches. It is asserted
in the first place that the private property of the citizen cannot
be taken for the benefit of a limited class in the taxing district
to the exclusion of the remainder of the community: That the
use to which the funds exacted by the power of taxation is de-
voted must be open to all the members of the taxing district on
equal terms and conditions and that the exercise of taxation in
the specific case at bar is for the benefit of the land owner of the
district alone, and that this use is accordingly a private one and
not for the benefit of the public at large, and that any incidental
benefit which the State may derive no matter how important or
extensive does not and cannot make a private use a public one."
7 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., il U. S. 701, wherein it is said by Mr.
Justice Field: '" It is not open to doubt that it is in the power of the State to
require local improvements to be made, which are essential to the health and
firosfierity of any community within its borders. To this end it may provide
for the construction of canals for draining marshy and malarious districts and
of levees to prevent inundations, as well as for the ofiening of streets and of
roads in the country." (Not italicized in original).
8 Bradley v. Falibrook Irri. Dist., 68 Fed. Rep. 948.
9 The Bondholders would not of course be entirely without remedy in
case the districts should refuse to pay the bonds, or were unable to do so,
because taxpayers availed themselves of the principles. laid down in the
decision. They might, of course, follow the proceeds of the bonds, in equity,
and seize on the works constructed with them. This would involve a change
of security.
10 The case in point was a suit in equity to enjoin the execution of a deed
of certain land of the complainant given by the collector of the defendant irri-
gation district under a sale to satisfy a delinquent assessment against his
property, and the argument proceeds on the ground that such an enforcement
of the assessment by the district officials with certain provisions of the consti-
tution of the U. S., which declares that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law, and that the act provided for the taking of
private property for private use, the decision proceeds: "It is the purpose and
use of a work which determines its character. Streets and highways are in
their routine public; for the very purpose of their construction is the
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This contention strikes at the very root of the question-what
are the constituent elements of a public corporation? and what
is the public use for which the power of taxation may be exer-
cised? Can any ultimate increase in the general prosperity of all
the citizens of a community justify the imposition of an assess-
ment for the proximate benefit of a class even where the inci-
dence of the assessment is limited to the class immediately bene-
fited? In other words, can no great public improvement be
wrought because the immediate effect of it be to benefit a specific
class? It is apparent from a close examination of the cases in
which the power of taxation by local boards has been upheld that
a square negative to this question cannot be maintained.
The power of taxation or of enforced assessments is habit-
ually exercised for the benefit of a class which may be more
or less numerous but clearly distinguishable from the great
class of the people of a municipality. A schoolhouse located
in a defined subdivision of a city for the benefit of the resi-
dents of that subdivision benefits only those who have
accommodation of the public to the use of which every person is entitled upon
the same terms and conditions as every other person. Water appropriated or
designed for the use of cities and towns becomes charged with a public use;
for the very purpose of such appropriation is the supplying of the public with
their necessary element, and every person within such cities and towns is
entitled, or is on precisely the same terms and conditions. So, also, in dry and
arid regions like many and great sections of California where water is their
very life blood, is water appropriated or designed for the use of the public for
purposes of irrigation. But can this properly be said in respect of a district
however extensive its boundaries, when only certain persons are entitled to
enjoy its use-that is to say, where only the land owners in the district are
entitled to the use? Such land owners maybe many in number or they may be
few. It is manifest, however, that the character of the use is not to be vested
by the mere number of persons who may enjoy it. No man's property can be
constitutionally taken from him without his consent and transferred to certain
other men for their use, however numerous they may be, and that is just what
the legislation in question authorizes to be done. Private property is thereby
authorized to be assessed and sold to provide water to supply the land owners
in a certain district more or less limited in extent for irrigation purposes.
Every person within such district is not entitled to the use of the water so
provided upon the same terms and conditions as every other person, but only
those persons who happen to own land in the district; of course the property of
those individuals would thereby be improved, and indirectly the public good
be thereby advanced. But every improvement advances the public good,
every enterprise, no matter how strictly private it may be, if it be lawful and
adds to the health, comfort and happiness of the people, is for the public good.
The building of a house, or the planting of a useful or beautiful tree is for the
public good. But surely private property cannot be taken against the owner's
consent on the ground that the public interest would be thus promoted."
YALE LA W JOU.RNA4L.
children to send, but property owners are not relieved from tax-
ation because they have no children. The benefit to the
public at large requires the sacrifice of the individual who
receives only the indirect benefit of the general welfare.
Enforced assessments upon the land owners of a district formed
to drain swamp or overflowed lands have been supported as an
exercise of a public power of taxation not alone on sanitary
grounds but on the broader grounds of the public welfare.'
Assessment districts for the construction of levees to prevent
inundation may be referred to the police power to protect life and
property, but they are justified in the decisions on the ground of
a general public improvement. It is even impliedly admitted in
the decision itself that the territory to be irrigated may be so
extensive as to justify the construction of works at public expense
for the benefit of coming settlers, provided each may use the water
on the same conditions as any other.1" But can it be said that it is
legitimate to tax the people of the whole State for the benefit of
a section, but that it is not legitimate to accomplish the same
purpose by dividing the same section up into districts and com-
pelling the cost of the irrigation to be borne by the people whom
it directly benefits instead of by the people of the State at
large? It seems apparent that if the entire people of a State
" Hagar v. Board, etc., 47 Cal. U. S. 222 it was said: "But we need not
rest our decision on the narrow ground that this is strictly a local improve-
ment. On the contrary the reclamation of the vast bodies of swamp and
overflowed land in this State may justly be regarded as a public improvement
of great magnitude and of utmost importance to the community. If left wholly
to individual enterprise it would probably never be accomplished." And in
Irrigation District v. Cultivators, 76 Cal. 368, it was said: "The results to be
derived from a drainage law and one which has for its purpose the irrigation
of immense bodies of arid lands must necessarily be the same as respects the
public good; the one is intended to bring into cultivation and make productive
a large acreage of land which would otherwise remain uncuiltivated and unpro-
ductive of any advantage to the State, being useless, incapable of yielding any
revenue of importance toward the support of the general purposes of State
Government by reason of too much water flowing over, or standing upon, or
percolating through them. The other has for its main object the utilizing and
improvement of vast tracts of arid and unfruitful soil, desert-like in character,
much of it, which if water in sufficient quantity can be conducted upon and
applied to it, may be made to produce the same results as flow from the drain-
age of large bodies of swamp and overflowed lands."
12 ", The scope of the legislation under consideration is not limited to cases
where the territory designed to be supplied with water for irrigation is so
extensive as to assume the importance of a public undertaking and where thus
provided, the water is available to every person within the district upon the
same terms and conditions." (At page 96o).
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may be taxed for a local improvement which can only immediately
benefit the class who reside there, the same affect may be attaiied
by taxing the beneficiaries only; at most only a land owner can
obtain the direct benefit of irrigation works, and the construction
of any system whatever by the people of the State would be for
the immediate benefit only of those who purchased the land.
Either the State can undertake no system of irrigation at all,
or taxation for the proximate benefit of the irrigator must be found
to be constitutional, on the ground that the prosperity of the State
is absolutely dependent upon it. 3 From time immemorial
the power of public taxation has been exercised not only to develop
the land of a State but to enable the owners of it to enjoy
their property. The running of surveys, the building of roads,
draining canals, etc., have been undertaken not primarily that
all the members of the community may enjoy these objects of
23 Coster v. Tidewater Co. i8 N. J., Eq. p. 54; same case, P. 531, throws
an interesting light on the difference of opinion between even strict construc-
tionists as to when the incidental public benefits from a local improvement
may be so general as to justify the formation of a public corporation for its
attainment. The case arose in equity on injunction proceedings against a
corporation formed to clear a large area of swamp land in New Jersey of the
water. None of the members of the corporation owned the land to be cleared,
but the corporation was vested with right of eminent domain, and to charge
the cost of the proceedings by assessment upon the owners. In chancery,
Zabriskie chancellor (ig N. J. Eq. 54) held that the powers employed by the
corporation of assessment, etc., could not be sustained, on the ground that the
corporation was not formed to attain an object in which the public had a use, be-
cause the public "cannot use the meadows or the dykes, ditches, drains, culverts,
pumps or machinery; any stranger walking upon them" (the meadows evidently),
-pasturing his horse, or cutting grass there would be a trespasser. No right is
granted to any of the public." So far as the act was sustained at all it was on
the ground of a public regulation of private property as a sort of g zasiparty
wall (see infra discussion of Judge Ross' second objection). On appeal to the
Court of Errors, however Beasley, C. J., also a strict constructionist, said,
upholding the use as a public one (i8 N. J., Eq. 531), "That the legislative
authority is competent to effect the end provided for in this act I can entertain
no doubt. The purpose contemplated is to retain and bring into use a tract
of land covering about one-fourth of the county of Hudson and several thous-
and acres in the county of Union. This large district is now comparatively use-
less. In its present condition it impairs very materially the benefits which
naturally belong to the adjacency of the territory of the State to the navigable
waters. It is difficult from the great expense of such works to build roads across
it and consequently it has heretofore interposed a barrier to anything like easy
access except by means of railroads from one town to another situated upon its
borders. To remove these evils and to make this vast region fit for habitation
and use seems to me plainly within the legitimate province of legislation and
to affect such ends I see no reason to doubt that both the prerogatives of tax-
ation and of eminent domain may be resorted to."
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public expenditure, but that the contiguous land may be made
productive, that the raw material of all wealth may be pro-
duced, and that as an indirect result population may be attracted
and the objects of taxation may increase.
A very large area of the Western States is arid land. Any
public measure for their irrigation will benefit only the land
owners. "Any terms and conditions" on which "all" may enjoy
the "right to use the water for the purpose of irrigation" can
in any event be immediately enjoyed only by the land owners.
That a broad distinction exists between taxation for the devel-
opment of land and for the protection of manufacturers is obvi-
ous. Without the land none can live. It lies at the base of all
industry and material happiness. Every increase in the fertility
of large areas powerfully affects every class of industry, while
the extinction of the fertility of the land wipes out civilization
itself. The imposition of a protective tariff enables a class
-the manufacturer-to charge more for the article he produces
than he otherwise could. But the exercise of taxation to irri-
gate land is primarily to make the State itself inhabitable; not
primarily to benefit the land owner considered as a class but to
prepare the land itself, the common source of all wealth, to sup-
port successive generations and form the foundation stone of a
splendid civilization.
Can it be claimed that the national government would have
no authority to appropriate money to reclaim a barren desert in
its midst whose domain might be sufficient for the construction of
many States? and that it could not tax all the people to so pro-
vide homes for the overflowing population? In every nation
where systems of irrigation have been required, the subject has
overleaped the limits of private right into the great domain of
public regulation and control requiring a unitary system and
constantly tending toward the exercise of eminent domain and
public taxation.14
11 As to the general power of the State to authorize such taxation, it was
said in: IZ Re Madera, etc., 92 Cal., "If in the exercise of its care for the
public welfare it finds that a specific district of the State needs legislation that
is inapplicable to other parts of the State, it may in the absence of constitu-
tional restrictions, legislate directly for that district; or if it be the case that
similar legislation be required for other portions of the State it may provide
for adopting such legislation or such portions at the will of the people in such
districts as was done in the reclamation and levee laws already referred to. It
may, too, by general laws authorize the inhabitants of any district under such
restrictions and with such preliminary steps as it may deem proper to organize
themselves into a public corporation for the purpose of exercising those
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The danger of this point of view is the confusion of a public
use with a public I'benefit." If the two are not kept sharply dis-
tinct there will be no bounds to the exercise of the- powers of
governmental duties upon the same principle as it authorized the incorporation of
any municipal corporation under general laws," and in Board of Directors
v. Tregea, 88 Cal. 334, it has said "whether the tax be by direct imposition for
revenue or by assessment for a local improvement, it is based upon the theory
that it is in return for the benefit received by the person who pays the tax or
by the property which is assessed. For the purpose of apportioning this bene-
fit the legislature may determine in advance what property will be benefited
by designating the district within which it is to be collected, as well as the
property upon which it is to be imposed; or it may appoint a commission or
delegate to a subordinate agency the power to ascertain the extent of this
benefit. It may itself declare that the entire State is benefited and authorize
the burden to be borne by a public tax; or it may declare that all or a portion
of the property within a limited region is benefited, either according to its value,
or in proportion to its actual benefit to be specifically ascertained by the actual
determination of officers appointed therefor. It is not necessary to show that
the property within the district may be actually benefited by the local
improvements, and even if it positively appears that no benefit is received,
such property is not thereby exempted from bearing its portion of the assess-
ment, nor is the act unconstitutional because it provides that such property
shall be assessed. Property that is exempt from taxation has always been
held subject to the burdens of assessment for local improvements and property
within a district that is not susceptible of receiving any immediate benefit from
the improvement is nevertheless so indirectly benefited thereby, that it must
bear a portion of the burden. If within the limits of a levee district a parcel
of land should be so situated as not to require the protection of the levee, that
would be no reason for excluding it from its share of the expense, or if within
the limits of the drainage district there should chance to be found a cliff that
would be no reason for exempting it from assessment." In Hagar v. Board,
etc., 47 Cal. 222, it was said: "The authority to compel local improve-
ments at the expense of those to be immediately benefited is not taxation,
though referable to the taxing power. It has never been held that taxation for
general purposes or for local improvements is an infringement of that clause
of the constitution relating to the acquisition and enjoyment of property tax,
nor does the enforcement of a valid tax by whatever method constitute a tak-
ing of property without due process of law in the sense of the constitution, nor
is it a taking of private property for public use within the purview of that
instrument." And in Hagar 'v. Reclamation Dist., iii U. S. 705, by Justice
Field it was said: "The expense of such works may be charged against
parties specially benefited and be made a lien upon their property. All that
is required in such cases is that the charges shall be apportioned in some just
and reasonable mode according to the benefits received. Absolute equality in
imposing them may not be reached. only an approximation to it may be
attainable. If no direct and insidious discriminations in favor of certain persons
to the prejudice of others be made, it is not a valid objection to the mode
pursued that to some extent inequalities may arise 
'1* * wherever a local
improvement is authorized, it is for the legislature to prescribe the way in which,
the means to meet its cost shall be raised, whether by general taxation or by lay-
ing the burden upon the district specially benefited by the expenditure."
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taxation except such as may lie in the discretion of the legis-
lature. The early notion of a public "use" under the common
law was the right of each member of a community to enjoy a
material thing as water, or a public park, purchased with the
public funds. The growing necessities of a complex society and
large population led to an extension of this notion of a public use to
such objects as might be enjoyed by each member of a taxing dis-
trict; and where large areas of the land of a state are to be reclaimed
by drainage or irrigation the law makes a further extension and on
grounds of necessity finds by construction the conception of public
use satisfied by the possible ownership which each member of the
community and successive generations may have therein. The
land is fixed while the generations change. But this exception
must be confined to the land and is justified only by its peculiar
relation to the state.1
The second vital objection raised by the decision is that
if the enforced assessment be referred to the peculiar power of
the Legislature to establish regulations for the improvement of a
common tract of land, owned in severalty and susceptible only
of a joint improvement, at joint expense1 -- no sufficient oppor-
tunity was afforded the land owner to contest the validity of
the proceedings upon which the assessment was based. This
legislative power is called, in the decision, "The powers of
assessment for local improvement."
The terminology is misleading and the power defined by the
Supreme Court must be clearly distinguished from the power of
assessment enforced by a municipality upon the adjacent land
15 Nobody can obtain the use of the water on a city street except the real
estate owner. Any member of the community may purchase a house on the
street and obtain the benefit of the water on payment of the tax. So any
individual may purchase land in an irrigation district and obtain the water on
payment of the tax. Another more striking instance i the creation of supreme
courts of appeal by the legislature at public expense under a constitution
allowing a legislature to create a "supreme court and such inferior courts as
they may see fit." Under such provisions the legislature may largely confine
the right of appeal to the highest court to persons only whose controversies
involve titles to real estate. The upshot of which is that other litigants are
supplying taxes to create a supreme court for the immediate use of citizens
having law suits involving such titles.
16 In Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 S. 613 it was called: "The power of the
legislature to establish regulations by which adjoining lands held by various
owners in severalty, and in the improvement of which all have a common inter-
est, but which by reason of the peculiar natural condition of the whole tract
cannot be improved or enjoyed by any of them without the concurrence of all,
may be reclaimed and made useful at their joint common expense."
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owners for the construction of roads, sewers, etc. For this power
springs from the power of taxation." It is according to the cases
one aspect of this supreme legislative power over the property of
the citizen. But how can a forced assessment be exercised by
members of a class for their private use? If referable to the power
of taxation it can be exercised only for a public use which deter-
mines the limit of the taxing power. Nor is it the power of emi-
nent domain, for that power is based upon full compensation to
the citizen for the property taken, and where the assessment
exceeds the benefit received it involves to that extent a condem-
nation of the surplus without compensation. It is, therefore,
neither an exercise of the power of taxation, assessment for local
improvement as usually understood, nor of eminent domain. It
is an anomalous principle in the law of property rights. It has
its origin in ancient usage and is analogous to the principle
which requires the joint tenants of a party wall to share the
expense of its repair. The principle was first clearly enunciated
by the Supreme Court of the United States in construing a Mill
Act, which allowed a land owner to erect and use a mill on a
non-navigable river upon paying the adjacent owner damages for
the overflow and it was said by the court in upholding the con-
stitutionality of the act."
"The question whether the erection and maintenance of mills
for manufacturing purposes under a general mill act of which any
owner of landupon a stream not navigable may avail himself at will
can be upheld as a taking by delegation of the right of eminent
domain of private property for public use in the constitutional
sense is so important and far reaching that it does not become
this Court to express an opinion upon it, when not required for
the determination of the rights of the parties before it. We pre-
fer to rest the decision of this case upon the ground that such a
statute considered as regulating the manner in which the rights
17 State v. Fuller, 34 N. J., L. 227. So in in re Madera 92 Cal. It was
said "while it is held that an apportionment of the expenses for a Jocal
improvement is to be made according to its benefits received by the property
assessed, yet the power to make such apportionment rests upon the general
power of taxation and the apportionment itself does not depend upon the fact
of local benefit in any other sense than that all taxes are supposed to be based
upon the benefit received by the tax payer. The benefit is not the source of
the power." So the legislature may designate the district which will be bene-
fited by the improvements, Diggins v. Brown, 76 Cal. 318, orby commissioners
appointed to make specific assessments upon the several parcels of land.
Pacific B. Co. v. Kirkham, 64 Cal. 519; Keese v. City of Denver, io Colo. 13.
Is In Herd v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 20.
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of proprietors of land adjacent to a stream may be asserted and
enjoyed with a due regard to the interests of all and to the pub-
lic good is within the constitutional power of the Legislature.
When property in which several persons have a common interest
cannot be fully and beneficially enjoyed in its existing condi-
tions the law often provides a way in which they may compel one
another to submit to measures necessary to secure its beneficial
enjoyment, making equitable compensation to any whose control
of an interest in the property is thereby modified.""
The origin of this distinction appears to lie deep down in the
-vitals of the principle that holders of property are under mutual
obligation not to use their property so as to injure another, and
that a refusal to join in an improvement required for the common
utilization of common privileges is an injustice which the law
will not suffer. It is a somewhat forced construction to bring
the Wright Act with its great machinery of artificial conditions
under the scope of this principle.
It is, however, essential to the second vital objection raised
that the act must be brought under this principle. For his con-
tention is that as the act vests no authority in the Board of Super-
visors to "hear" objections to the petition, or a contest as to its
compliance with the statutory requisites of signature by a re-
quired number of freeholders.21
19 After considerable conflict and wabbling in the cases, the New Jersey
acts providing for the drainage of swamp lands and the assessment of the cost
upon the land owners is upheld, not as an exercise of the right of taxation for
a public use or eminent domain as held in In Re Lower Chatham 35, N.
J. L. 501, and many other cases, but as based on ancient use and analogous to
party walls. Such corporations are not public corporations, nor are the assess-
,ments enforced referable to power of taxation or eminent domain.
In Re Pequest Rives, 41 N. J. L. 175.
e The argument of the decision proceeds:
"Not only does the legislation in question provide for the assessing and
selling and thus for the taking of private property, in order to supply water for
irrigation to specific persons within the district and to those only, but all of
this is authorized to be done without affording the owner any opportunity to
be heard in opposition to the validity of the proceedings. As has
been seen, the act provides as a condition precedent to the organization
of the district, the presentation to the Board of Supervisors of the county
in which the lands or the greater portion thereof are situated, at a regular
meeting of such board, of a petition signed by fifty or a majority of the holders
of title or evidence of title to lands susceptible of one mode of irrigation from
a common source and by the same system of works as shown by the equalized
county assessment roll next preceding the presentation of the petition, which
petition shall specifically describe the proposed boundaries of the district and
ask that it be organized under the provision of the act. The Supreme Court
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of California said in the Madera Irrigation case, 92 Cal., 323, in answer to the
present objection to the act that the proceeding for the organization of the
district ' does not affect the property of any one within the district, and that he is
not by virtue thereof deprived of any property. Such result does not arise until
after the delinquency on his part in the payment of an assessment that may be
levied upon his property, and before that time he has opportunity to be heard as
to the correctness of the valuation which is placed upon his property, and made
the basis of his assessment. He does not, it is true, have any opportunity to be
heard otherwise than by his vote in determining the amount of bonds to be
issued or the rate of assessment with which they are to be paid; but in this
particular he is in the same condition as is the inhabitant of any municipal organ-
ization which incurs a bonded indebtedness or levies a tax for its payment.
His property is not taken from him without due process of law, if he is allowed
a hearing at any time before the lien of assessment thereon becomes final.'
A hearing as to what? The only hearing provided for by the statute is
as to the correctness of the valuation put by the assessor upon the property
assessed. Nor can I at all agree that the proceeding for the organization of the
district ' does not affect the property of any one within the district.' The
_Aelition for the organization of the district was the foundation of the whole
proceeding.- Without the required petition no step could be taken looking to
the organization of the district here in question. It has jurisdictional in the
strictest sense. Two weeks' notice of the time of presentation of the petition is
required tobe given by publication when presented, the statute declares the board
of supervisors shall hear the same and may adjourn such hearing from time to
time not exceeding four weeks in all, and, on the final hearing may make such
changes in the proposed boundaries as they may find to be proper, and shall
establish and define such boundaries; provided, that said board shall not
modify said boundaries so as to except from the operation of this act any ter-
ritory within the boundaries of the district proposed by said petitioners which
is susceptible of irrigation by the same system of works applicable to other
lands in said proposed district, nor shall any of the lands which will not in the
judgment of said board be benefited by irrigation by said system, be included
within such district; provided that any person whose lands are susceptible of
irrigation from the same source may in the discretion of the board upon appli-
cation in writing to said board have such lands included in such district.
Notwithstanding the fact that the petition is by the statute made the basis
of the proceeding which is to culminate in diverting the title of the owner of
land against his consent, there is here not only no opportunity afforded such
owner to test the sufficiency of the petition, for the power of the board of
supervisors is in terms limited to making such changes in the boundaries pro-
posed by the petitioners as it may deem proper subject to the condition that it
shall not except from the operation of the act any territory within the boun-
daries proposed by the petitioners, which is susceptible of irrigation by the
same system of work applicable to the other lands in said proposed district, nor
include within the boundaries which it is required to establish and define
within four weeks after the presentation of the petitioners, any lands which, in
its judgment will not be benefited by irrigation by the same system of works.
Every one must admit that in the matter in question the Board of Super-
visors has only such power as is expressly or by necessary implication con-
ferred upon it by the statute itself. Not only is it not thereby given the power'
to inquire into the sufficiency of the petition, but the express statutory require-
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ments preclude any such inquiry by it at the instance of any owner of land
adversely affected if at all. Yet the petition may not have been signed by the
required number of holders of title or evidence of title to lands within the dis-
tricts, and if not, there was then nobasis upon which the proceedings could rest.
Whatever construction might otherwise be placed upon the word 'hear'
used in the statute, it cannot be held to include the power to determine the
entire merits of the petition in view of the affirmative requirement contained in
the same sentence that on its final hearing the board 'shall establish and
define such boundaries.' The Board is of necessity required to determine for
itself whether the petition upon its face is sufficient to put its powers into motion;
yet its determination in that respect is not conclusive upon anyone. Had
it been impowered to entertain a contest, for example, by a land owner
in respect to the question whether those signing the petition were, in truth,
the holders of title or evidence of title to lands susceptible of one mode
of irrigation from a common source and by the same system of works, and it
should find in favor of the contestant upon that issue, it would necessarily be
obliged to deny the petition and dismiss the proceedings. Yet so far from
that course being allowed by the statute, it provides, as has been seen,
that the Board of Supervisors shall hear the petition, and may adjourn
such hearing from time to time, not exceeding four weeks in all, and,
in express terms, declares that on the final hearing of such petition it may
make such changes in the proposed boundaries as it may find to be proper and
shall establish and define such boundaries. After the Board of Supervision
shall have so established and defined the boundaries of the proposed district,
and shall have divided it into divisions, the Board is by the statute required to
give notice of an election to be held in such proposed district for the purpose
of determining whether or not the same shall be organized under the provisions
of the act. The notice is required to describe the boundaries so established, and
to designate a name for such proposed district. In the event two-thirds of the
votes cast at such election are in the affirmative, the Board of Supervisors is by
the statute required to declare, by an order entered on its minutes such territory
duly organized as an irrigation district under the name and style heretofore
designated, and to declare the persons receiving respectively the highest num-
ber of votes for the several offices to be duly elected thereto, and to cause a cer-
tified copy of such order to be immediately filed for record in the office of the
county recorder of each county in which any portion of such laud is situated; and
to mail immediately forward a copy thereof to the clerk of the board of super-
visors of each of the counties in which any portion of the district may lie.
And the statute declares that from and after the date of such filing the
organization of such district shall be complete, and the officers thereof shall
hold their respective offices until their successors are elected and qualified.
The organization of the district is thus completed according to the statute.
without at any time or place affording the owner of any land within the bound-
aries of the district the opportunity to question or contest the sufficiency of the
petition which lay at the foundation of the whole proceedings. From first
to last at no time or place is the owner of land within the district given
the opportunity to be heard in respect to the essential and all-important
question whether the petition upon which all the proceedings rest, and
under which his property is to be assessed, sold and conveyed, conforms to
the requirement of the statute; whether or not, it is in fact, signed by fifty or a
majority of the holders of title or evidence of title to lands within the district,
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as shown by the last equalized assessment roll immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition. Without such a petition as has been said no step
could be taken looking to the organization of the district, (Milligan v. Smith, 59
Cal. 2o6, Zeigler v. Hopkins, I7 U. S. 688, 6 Sup. Ct gig) and of course with-
out a legally organized district there can be no such thing as assessment.
To say, therefore, as did the Supreme Court of California in the Madera
Irrigation case that the land owner ' has opportunity to be heard as to the
correctness of the valuation which is placed upon his property and made the
basis of his assessment,' does not at all answer the objection. So that, under
the provisions of the statute in question, the land of an individual may be
assessed and sold, and, according to the averments of the bill will, unless the
court intervenes, be conveyed and thus taken, without affording its owner any
opportunity whatever to question the sufficiency of the petition upon which the
whole proceedings are based. That this would be to deprive such owner of his
Property without due process of law, would seem to be very clear, in judging
what is 'due process of law.' Said the Supreme Court of the U. S. in Hagar
v. Reclamation Dist., III U. S. 708.4 Sup. Ct 663: 'Respect must be had to the
cause and object of the taking, whether under the taxing power, the power of emi-
nent domain, or the power of assessment for localimprovement, or some of these;
and, if found to be suitable or admissible in the special case, it will be adjudged
to be due process of law, but, if found to be arbitrary, oppressive and unjust,
it may be declared to be due process of law. Assessments in Cal#/orxia for the
purpose of reclaiming overflowed and swamp lands to which the Supreme court
of California in the cases cited likened to the irrigation districts are enforced by
suits in which, as held by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hagar v.
Reclamation Dist., Supra, the owner may set up by way of defense, all his objec-
tions to the validity of the proceedings, and he is, therefore, in such proceedings
afforded 'due process of law.' In the present case, however, as has been shown,
the owner whose property is authorized to be taken is not afforded any oppor-
tunity whatever, at any time or place, before any board or tribunal, to question
the sufficiency of the very thing which lies at the foundation of the whole pro-
ceedings. This trial objection to the legislation in question is in no manner
answered by the fact that by a supplemental act of the legislature of California,
approved March 16, 1889 (86 Cal. 1889, pp. 212, 213) the boardof directors of any
irrigation district is authorized to commence a special proceeding in a Superior
Court of the County in which the lands or some portion thereof are situated in
which after the publication of notice of the proceeding. any person interested
may come in and contest the legality and validity of 'each and all of the proceed-
ings for the organization of said district under the provisions of the said act,
from and including the petition for the organization of the district, and all other
proceedings which may affect the legality or validity of said bonds, and the order
for the sale and the sale thereof.' Such a proceeding may or may not be insti-
tuted by the board of directors of the district, and was not instituted in the
present instance so far as appears from the Bill. No man's constitutional
rights can depend upon an option which may or may not be exercised by
another."
Evidently if only the power of taxation is concerned no such
"hearing" would be required. As the State may form a public
corporation for a public purpose against the will of the citizen,
and it would in this instance be of no vital importance, whether
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the petition was sufficient or not for the effective- determinant
in the formation of the corporation would be the two-third vote of
the legal voters of the district, and since the corporation could be
formed in any way the Legislature saw fit, the Legislature would
have the discretionary power to make the initiatory proceed-
ings of the petition merely formal,"' and the right of the citizen
to be heard as to the justice of the assessment of his prop-
erty would be satisfied by the provision in the act for a hearing
before the Board of Equalization. If, however, considered as a
special proceeding to enforce a public regulation of private
property the statutory requisites be considered jurisdictional, it
does not appear that the citizen cannot question the sufficiency
of the petition. The statute expressly asserts that they "shall
"hear" the petition and expressly allows them to adjourn for
that purpose. How can the, Board "hear" the petition and why
should they publish a notice of the time and place where it is to be
considered unless the citizen is to be granted an opportunity
to appear and be heard. If the petition is jurisdictional as
asserted, it would be absurd to argue that the statute conipels the
Board to proceed on a void petition. This would be to construe
the statute to require all the machinery of act to be set in
motion, although all the proceedings are void. A more common-
sense interpretation of the statute would seem to give the word
"shall" in the clause declaring that "A petition shall be presented
* * * signed by the required number of holders of Title,"
equivalent force with the "shall" in the words "shall hear," and
"shall proceed," and to hold that the statute requires the signa-
ture of the required numbers; that it does not provide for any
other kind of a petition; that the supervisors must discover
whether the act is complied with; and that the word "hear"
21 In Re Madera, 92 Col. it was said: "The steps provided for the organ-
ization of the district are only for the creation of a public corporation to be
invested with certain political duties which it is to exercise in behalf of the
state. It has never been held that the inhabitants of a district are entitled to
notice and hearing upon a proposition to submit such question to a popular
vote. In the absence of constitutional restriction it would be competent forthe legislature to create such public corporations, even against the will of the
inhabitants. It has as much power to create the district. * *
It must be observed that such proceeding does not affect the property of any
one within the district, and that he is not by virtue thereof deprived of any
property. Such result does not arise until after delinquency on his part in the
payment of an assessment that may be levied upon his property, and before
that time he has opportunity to be heard as to the correctness of the valuatioa
which is placed upon his property, and made the cause of his assessment.
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implies a hearing of any and all objections, including those going
to the sufficiency of the petition. As a matter of fact the practice
is to hear objections.22
The decision of Judge Ross is strong but oblique. There is
an evident failure to give a full consideration to the cases arising
under the Reclamation Act upon whose outlines the Wright act
is based, and in whose constitutionality the learned judge acqui-
esced as one of the Supreme Court of California. While the
exercise of the taxing power authorized by the Act may be found
constitutional,' many of its provisions may be justly criticised
as too arbitrary.
The absolute power vested in the Board of Supervisors to in-
clude or exclude such lands practically as they see fit' is capable of
great abuse to the detriment of adjacent land owners. There
should be a right of appeal to the Superior Court on the ground
of an abuse of discretion. So under the amended Section Fifteen
of the Actn ostensibly providing for special elections to provide
additional funds for construction purposes, a clause is slipped in
allowing the directors to supply the money by assessment even
if voters refuse to provide it, so practically placing in their power
all the property of the district without any check or control what-
ever. Cities and towns should not be included without a majority
vote of their citizens without reference to the vote of the remainder
of the district. The debt which the district can incur should be
limited to a reasonable proportion of the valuation of the property
of the district.
A more stringent provision should also be adopted defining
what sources of water may be sought for irrigation purposes. An
act which allows all the land in the taxing district to be voted
away to catch possible rain water, 6 puts a premium on dishonesty
and allows the great public power of taxation vested in trust in the
district for the public welfare to be distorted for the benefit of-4.
speculators.
The tendency of such arbitrary and careless legislation is
22 Board of Directors v. Tregea at p. 355.
As to various remedies open to a taxpayer who questions the sufficiency of
the petition, see 92 Cal. 334. This objection is also of minor importance
because the act may be amended by the legislature so as to explicitiy provide
for a hearing.
2 The Irrigation cases are now on appeal before the U. S. Supreme Court.
2 See Board of Directors v. Tregea, 88 COL, 354, where this power is de-
clared final and conclusive beyond appeal.
5 Laws Cal. i89i, page 147, Chap. CXX., viii.
26 See Fallhook 7. Bradley, Irr. Dis., 68 Fed. Rep. 948.
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undemocratic and unjust. Unfortunately legislation, depriving
political subdivisions of the right to vote on the question of
local improvements for which they are taxed, is on the increase.
A law was recently introduced in the legislature of New York
vesting in the supervisors of the county the right by an arbitrary
vote to force taxation on the state, county and city.27 If this
kind of statutory evolution goes on all the property in the
country will be subject to the arbitrary power of "Boards"-
and sometimes very wooden ones-of minor officials who are
often as ignorant as they are irresponsible; and the taxpayer
might as well pay the full value of his property at once into the
public treasury and live on such gratuities of provender as these
petty magnates see fit to dole out to him.
Williqm P. Aiken.
27 A good-roads bill was put into the bill box by Senator Nussbaum (Rep.,
Albany) to-day. It provides that boards of supervisors of counties by a major-
ity vote may improve public roads by laying down macadam, telford-macadam
roads, or roads of other stone or concrete material. When a board of supervi-
sors decides to improve the highways, a superintendent of roads shall be
appointed who shall be a civil engineer and surveyor. Maps of roads are to
be prepared by the superintendent and submitted to the board of supervisors
and the State Engineer for approval. The superintendent's salary is to be a
county charge and the costs of improvements are to be assessed as follows: x5
per cent on the town in which the improvements are to be made, or if in two
or more towns a ratable assessment; 35 per cent on the county at large, and 5o
per cent on the State."-N. Y. Ev. Post, Jan. 23, x896. So the Good Roads
Act of Connecticut taxes, at the instance of the vote of the town, both the
county and the state. The state votes by the legislature, the town by its cit-
izens, where does the county come in?
